'Governments Should Not Negotiate With Terrorists Essay\r'

'Would you give a burglar $100,000 to select your stolen purse back? If you were to give a thief $100,000, you would venture him think that he bottom of the inning train a profit out of thieving purses. The thief would also habituate the $100,000 to vitiate a gun or some former(a)wise weapons or vehicles that would help him steal emerging purses. Now think about the thief as a terrorist and you as a establishment. Should governments negotiate with terrorists? act of terrorism activities hold up change magnitude these past few years collectable to faulty finishs do by governments when relations with terrorists.\r\nMany start out shuffling the geological fault of compromising with terrorists, which makes them appear weak and targetable, which only sponsors future terrorist acts. The outcomes of past government agreements with terrorists study only worsened and perpetuated this land site. The stip polish offiary of one million million millions of dollars as exchange to terrorist kidnappers and hostage/ wantrs has also fuel future terrorist round d gos and has only made terrorism profitable, reservation it much than(prenominal) disembowelive to terrorists.\r\nGovernments legitimize terrorism by compromising; thusly governments should non negotiate with terrorists, rather interact and weaken their make-ups by refusing them any concessions and targeting individuals within their groups. The reasoning behind terrorism is that emphasis can be used to attract the care of governments and the general public, who as a turn out, succumb to the terrorist’s ideas and/or desires. Unfortunately, this terrorist play is sometimes effective, like in the 2004 capital of Spain Bombings. On March 11, ETA, a terrorist organization, bombed quartette commuter trains in capital of Spain.\r\nTheir objective was to sustain a political change in Spain; the elections were that same weekend. Before the bombings, the People’s Party was the voter’s favorite, still ETA’s terrorist beleaguer caused a drastic change in the ballot and the state-controlled Party won. later winning the election, the socialist Party decided to mop up the Spanish troops in Iraq, which is what ETA treasured. Because of this turn of until nowts, kill says: â€Å"…the terrorists would be able to claim that their bombings had influenced two a European election and the situation in Iraq.\r\n” (Downing 38-39) Since the people and the government reacted to the attack the right smart ETA wanted it too, the terrorists could have considered the attack successful, and as a consequence whitethorn attack again. The put across the government send ETA is that if they want a change, they should just use violence to obtain it. Governments moldiness be careful with terrorist’s interest and their own interests when do controversial decisions, especially those made shortly subsequently terrorist attacks, like t he bombings in Madrid. In that theatrical role, the decision was whether or non to remove Spanish troops from Iraq.\r\nETA wanted them removed, and the Socialist Party decided to remove them because of the pressure they were put under. Removing the troops was a mistake because it just pleased the terrorists; it made the terrorists feel they can manipulate the government with pressure induced by brutality. Governments should always include terrorist interests in definitive decision-making, besides non to make the decision in the terrorist’s favor, rather to make the decision in a way that terrorists are non satisfied by it and cannot take any credit from it.\r\nGovernments must show that they are strong, and that they are not and go away not be influenced by terrorism. (Downing 38-39) Governments make themselves appear weak by succumbing to pressure, and sometimes the pressure does not unconstipated come from the terrorists in the situation, but from other governments , draws or groups. Even if they competency want to interfere for the most tranquilityful reasons, peace negotiations with terrorists do not have the best outcomes. First of all, they are terrorists; therefore, their favorite and only way of attempting to achieve their goals is through violence.\r\nThis means that if they do not receive what they desire through chock up, they believe they cannot get it through peace either. Secondly, terrorists are irregular; they cannot be trusted. Thirdly, most terrorists do not back down, especially jihadists, because they are ordain to lose their life for what they believe in. Lastly, if a government makes peace with terrorists, and the terrorists do not keep their end of the deal, then the government will appear weak and defeated, period the terrorist will appear victorious. These are the reasons for which governments should not attempt to make peace with terrorists.\r\nThey should test to end terrorism instead of making a truce with it. A perfective tense example of why governments should not search peace from terrorists is an incident the U. S. government had in Fallujah. U. S. Marines attempted to via media with jihadists in Fallujah after being pressured by European officials and gentleman rights groups. The U. S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said they wanted peace instead of contend in Fallujah, but the jihadists misunderstood and considered the compromise a advantage over the Americans. (Rubin 19-20) As a result, the fault led to 30 car bombings.\r\n non only did the U. S. appear weak because of this failed compromise; it also encouraged the jihadists to enchant on with their terrorist acts because the jihadists believed they defeated them, and that they were capable of defeating them again. Truces with terrorists are truly sleek and unpredictable, and should always be avoided because an discriminatory outcome can be ruinous and can lead to more violence. bonny as truces with terrorists can be rattling tricky, negotiating with terrorist kidnappers and hostage-takers can be very tricky as well.\r\nRecently terrorists use these evasive action to create an audience full of suspense. These tactics now create more attention than massacres and bombings because people are getting more accustomed to them as they happen. (Rubin 22) Kidnappings/hostage number are becoming more and more popular and sadly, governments have been making it even more popular by making it profitable. They make it profitable by negotiating and stipendiary saves to terrorists because negotiating with kidnappers legitimizes their act and as a result gain proliferates terrorism.\r\nIt has spread terrorism because the terrorists have learned that abduct/hostage-taking has become very profitable. (Rubin 23) In March 2000, Muammar al-Qadhafi, a Libyan leader, salaried Abu Sayyaf, a hostage-taker based in the Philippines, a $25 million ransom for the release of priests, teachers, and children he h ad kidnaped from a school. (Rubin 23) After receiving the money, Abu Sayyaf expanded his terrorist group from a suspender hundred to more than a yard members and bought speedboats and weapons, which were used for other kidnappings.\r\nBy remunerative the terrorist such a large ransom to keep the captives from getting harmed, Muammar al-Qadhafi funded future kidnappings, place more people in danger. The paying of the ransom also made kidnapping racy for Sayyaf, because they technically rewarded him for terrorism, encouraging him to brook out more terrorist acts because he will get money or other concession out of them. The same case occurred in Sahel. The â€Å"Bin Laden of the repudiate”, Ammari Saifi, took 32 European vacationers in the Algerian desert, and held them hostage for 177 days. The German government paid a five million euro\r\nransom and they were released, but Ammari Saifi used the money to taint weapons and vehicles. (Rubin 24) The German government fund ed future kidnappings analogous to how the Libyan leader did. It is a word form: terrorists kidnap citizens; they ask for reward in return for the hostages; and then they use the ransom they get paid to repeat this calendar method of birth control more effectively (with new and more members, weapons and vehicles). Governments should not keep rewarding terrorists with million dollar ransoms because all they have been doing is perpetuating the cycle per second instead of ending it.\r\nGovernments should use force to go back captives and avoid rewarding terrorists with ransoms. It is an literal U. S. government policy â€Å"to deny hostage takers the benefit of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession. ” (â€Å"Counter-Terrorism: History, Strategy and Tactics” Web) westbound governments should also respond to kidnapping by thinking about the safety of the absolute majority of their citizens instead of an individual. Even though it cou ld end in injury or ending of the captive, in the pine term it prevents encourage kidnappings.\r\n(Rubin, 24) So governments should try their best to recover captives, but without the use of ransoms because in the long run, a short tragedy is collapse than the endangerment a larger amount of citizens. Governments should not appease with terrorists, they should use intelligence to take them down instead. â€Å"In a war between networks, the side with superior intelligence wins. ” (Garreau 60) The more information and technology is obtained, the break down the chances of defeating the terrorists are because more effective strategies can be put into action. Governments should use this intimacy to find the leader and how to target them.\r\nThe leader of the group is key because the disruption or terrorist leaderships weaken terrorist organization and causes them to struggle and damp themselves. (Rubin, 27) This has been happening with Osama bin Laden and his terrorist org anization: â€Å"The loss of bin Laden and these other key operatives puts the network on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse. ” (â€Å"Country Reports on Terrorism 2011” Web) Be careful with this strategy: â€Å" give out the devil you agnise. Like [Libyan dictator][Moammar] Gaddafi, keep him alive, because you know him. Who knows what sort of clever mastermind susceptibility replace him.\r\n” (Garreau 60) Past concessions to terrorists have prove that government negotiations with them make terrorism productive; therefore governments should marginalize, isolate or run through the threat. Doing so would make terrorist acts unprofitable for those who carry them out. In order to avoid the further proliferation of terrorism, governments must take a secure stand against these foes and send a message of zero tolerance against terrorist acts. ? Works Cited â€Å"Chapter 1. strategical Assessment. ” U. S. Department of State. U. S. Departme nt of State, 31 July 2012. Web. 31 Jan. 2013. . â€Å"Counter-Terrorism: History, Strategy and Tactics.\r\n” Counter-Terrorism: History, Strategy and Tactics. Web. 31 Jan. 2013. . Downing, David. â€Å"Madrid Bombings. ” The War on Terror. Mankato: Arcturus Publishing, 2008. 38-39. Print. Garreau, Joel. â€Å"Intelligence gather Is the Best Way to Reduce Terrorism. ” At Issue. Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Succesful? Ed. Lauri S. Friedman. Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 2005. 57-63. Rubin, Michael and Suzanne Gershowitz. â€Å"Governments Should never Negotiate with Terrorists. ” At Issue. Should Governments Negotiate with Terrorists? Ed. Amanda Hiber. Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 2008. 15-29.\r\n'